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A perceived action can be understood only when information about the action carried out and the objects
used are taken into account. It was investigated how spatial and functional information contributes to
establishing these relations. Participants observed static frames showing a hand wielding an instrument
and a potential target object of the action. The 2 elements could either match or mismatch, spatially or
functionally. Participants were required to judge only 1 of the 2 relations while ignoring the other. Both
irrelevant spatial and functional mismatches affected judgments of the relevant relation. Moreover, the
functional relation provided a context for the judgment of the spatial relation but not vice versa. The
results are discussed in respect to recent accounts of action understanding.
Keywords: action comprehension, action recognition, mirror neurons, functional knowledge, tool use
Actions of tool use are combinatorial (e.g., Nowak, Plotkin, &
Jansen, 2000), that is, the same action (e.g., inserting something)
will have different effects depending on the instruments and target
objects used in its course (e.g., canceling a ticket and using a credit
card). Thus, theories assuming that actions are understood as soon
as their effects are known must address two questions. First, how
is the type of action identified? And, second, how do the objects
used in its course shape the understanding of the action?
Considerable research has been conducted on the question of
how the type of action is identified. It has been proposed that
perceived actions were matched directly to the representations an
observer would rely on if he or she carried out the actions (e.g.,
Hommel, Mu¨sseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001; Iacoboni, 2005;
Knoblich & Flach, 2003; Prinz, 2005; Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gal-
lese, 2001). Evidence for this idea comes from behavioral studies
that demonstrate interference effects between observed and to-be-
produced actions (e.g., Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschla¨ger, & Prinz,
2000; Kilner, Paulignan, & Blakemore, 2003; Stu¨rmer, Aschersle-
ben, & Prinz, 2000). Moreover, in the parietal and the premotor
cortices, neurons with mirror properties have been discovered that
fire when a particular object-directed action is carried out but also
when this action is only perceived (DiPellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi,
Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 1992; Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti,
1996; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi, 1996).
These common action representations seem to be coded pre-
dominantly in spatial terms. In action production, the parietal lobe
relates an object’s spatial properties to those of an effector (Milner
& Goodale, 1995; Rossetti & Pisella, 2002; Ungerleider & Mish-
kin, 1982). The object’s position is translated into the amplitude
and direction of a reaching movement (Bremmer, Duhamel, & Ben
Hamed, 1996), and its orientation, surface features, and size are
translated into possible grasp configurations (Murata, Gallese,
Luppino, Kaseda, & Sakata, 2000; Sakata & Taira, 1994). The
premotor cortex then combines these different aspects into a com-
plete action (e.g., Jeannerod, Arbib, Rizzolatti, & Sakata, 1995;
Rizzolatti, Luppino, & Matelli, 1998). Converging evidence comes
from behavioral studies showing that actions are afforded by the
spatial features of objects (Tucker & Ellis, 1998, 2001; Humphreys
& Riddoch, 2001) and that the performing of actions facilitates the
detection of spatially suitable target objects (Craighero, Fadiga,
Rizzolatti, & Umilta`, 1999).
During action perception, the parietal areas are also particularly
activated when a spatial analysis of the actions is required, for
example, when the actions are not known or have to be imitated
later (e.g., Decety & Chaminade, 2003; Decety et al., 1997; Melt-
zoff & Decety, 2003). Moreover, they are activated by the percep-
tion of object-directed actions in particular and in a somatotopic
manner in respect to the effector carrying out the action (Buccino
et al., 2001; Manthey, Schubotz, & von Cramon, 2003). Thus,
Oztop and Arbib (2002) have suggested that the premotor cortex
guides action by realizing the specific spatial relations between
effectors and target objects that are required for the action to
succeed. In action perception, the same representations could be
used to identify an action from the spatial relations it produces.
Note, however, that the parietal cortex is oblivious to object
identity and function (e.g., Milner & Goodale, 1995), and the firing
Patric Bach, Max Planck Institute for Psychological Research, Munich,
Germany and Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience, University of Wales,
Bangor, United Kingdom; Gu¨nther Knoblich, Max Planck Institute for
Psychological Research and Department of Psychology, Rutgers Univer-
sity; Thomas C. Gunter and Angela D. Friederici, Max Planck Institute for
Cognitive Neuroscience, Leipzig, Germany; Wolfgang Prinz, Max Planck
Institute for Psychological Research.
We thank Alexander Borkovski, Marco Petz, Stefanie Schuch, and Mike
Tucker for their valuable comments and Jana Hiller and Ina Fabbender for
the data collection.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Patric
Bach, Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience, University of Wales, Bangor,
Gwynedd LL57 2DG, United Kingdom. E-mail: p.bach@bangor.ac.uk
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Copyright 2005 by the American Psychological Association
Human Perception and Performance
2005, Vol. 31, No. 3, 465–479
0096-1523/05/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/0096-1523.31.3.465
465
pattern of the mirror neurons does not change when meaningless
3-D solids are acted upon (e.g., Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese,
2000). Therefore, actions involving tool use cannot be fully un-
derstood by relying solely on the spatial action representations in
the parietal-premotor pathway. Rather, the action representations
mediating the understanding of such actions also need to incorpo-
rate the objects that have to be used. The processing of object
identity and function has been associated with areas in the tempo-
ral lobe (for a review, see Martin & Chao, 2001) that receive input
from the ventral stream. This pathway has been described as being
parallel to the premotor-parietal pathway and has been implicated
in selecting objects for action according to the actor’s intention
(e.g., Milner & Goodale, 1995). Consistent with this idea, patients
with semantic dementia, whose temporal lobe is severely dam-
aged, can neither select another tool with a similar function, nor
can they select a typical target object of a tool (Hodges, Spatt, &
Patterson, 1999). Knowledge about object function can be selec-
tively impaired. Ochipa and colleagues (Ochipa, Rothi, & Heil-
man, 1989) reported a patient who was able to perform the appro-
priate movements of everyday tasks but failed to use the
appropriate objects (e.g., brushing teeth with a comb). Functional
imaging studies revealed temporal lobe activation during action
perception, particularly for the observation of meaningful object-
directed actions (Decety et al., 1997). Converging evidence comes
from an electrophysiological study in which movies of everyday
actions were presented (Sitnikova, Kuperberg, & Holcomb, 2003).
When an instrument with an inappropriate function was chosen
(e.g., using a rolling pin instead of a razor for shaving), the N400
component was elicited. The N400 is widely accepted as a measure
of semantic integration difficulty (for a review, see Kutas &
Federmeier, 2000), and it originates partially from generators in
the temporal lobe (Johnson & Hamm, 2000; Nobre & McCarthy,
1995).
We propose that the parietal-premotor and temporal activations
during action perception reflect the accessing of distributed action
representations that specify (a) which actions have to be carried
out for an intended effect to be achieved but also (b) the objects to
be used. Thus, an observed action can be understood—and its
effect can be derived—if the objects used and the action carried
out match such an action representation of the observer. The
present study tested one implication of this model. If action com-
prehension is mediated by representations as described above,
observers should not be able to selectively take either object-
related or action-related information into account, even if the
respective other type of information is completely irrelevant to the
task and has to be ignored. To test this assumption, we conducted
four experiments in which participants observed actions involving
the use of a tool. These actions had been rated with regard to (a)
the reciprocal associations between instruments and target objects,
(b) the familiarity of the actions, and (c) the saliency of the action
goal to be achieved (see the Appendix). Ratings were collected in
order for us to assess potential influences of these three factors.
The stimuli were designed in a way that allowed us to indepen-
dently manipulate the appropriateness of the objects and the ap-
propriateness of the action. The appropriateness of the action was
manipulated by varying the spatial relation between instrument
and target object. The appropriateness of the objects was manip-
ulated by choosing combinations of instrument and target object
that were or were not appropriate to produce a meaningful effect in
the environment (e.g., ticket, ticket canceller vs. ticket, credit card
reader). Across experiments, participants judged either the appro-
priateness of the action and were asked to ignore the appropriate-
ness of the objects (Experiments 1A and 1B) or vice versa (Ex-
periments 2A and 2B). We hypothesized that if participants solve
these tasks by relying on action representations that incorporate
object-related and action-related information, they should not be
able to refrain from taking either type of irrelevant information
into account even when instructed to ignore it.
We were also interested in the question of whether instru-
ments have a special status in action comprehension. Instru-
ments have well-known functions and prototypical target ob-
jects. Also, they are applied to these objects in a certain way.
Therefore, it is possible that the action to be carried out and the
expected-target objects are specified as soon as the instrument
is known, but not vice versa. To test this assumption, we
presented instrument and target object in different orders. The
instrument was presented either before or after the target object.
We hypothesized that if the relations are derived from instru-
ment knowledge, irrelevant spatial or functional mismatches
should have stronger effects when the instrument is presented
before the target object.
Experiment 1A: Plugs
The first experiment assessed whether participants can ignore
functional information about objects when judging whether a
perceived action is spatially appropriate. Participants observed two
consecutive still frames, one displaying a hand wielding an instru-
ment and one displaying the target object. Still frames of actions
were used because they evoke the corresponding actions and
motions (e.g., Kourtzi & Kanwisher, 2000; Stu¨rmer et al., 2000)
but also allow reaction times (RTs) to be measured relative to
unambiguous stimulus onsets. All actions were plugging actions.
For a plugging action to succeed, both the instrument and the slot
of the target object should have identical orientations. With or-
thogonal orientations, a plugging action will not be successful (cf.
Figures 1A and 1B). In regard to the functional relation, there are
certain combinations of plug and target objects that are associated
with an effect on the environment (e.g., screwdriver, screw), but
others that are not associated with such an effect (e.g., screwdriver,
keyhole; cf. Figures 1A and 1C). Thus, there were four conditions:
full match (cf. Figure 1A), spatial mismatch (c.f. Figure 1B),
Figure 1. Example of a plugging action: (a) full match, (b) spatial mismatch, (c) functional mismatch, and (d)
double mismatch.
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functional mismatch (cf. Figure 1C), and double mismatch (cf.
Figure 1D).
The participants’ task was to judge whether the spatial relation
was appropriate for a plugging action but to ignore the functional
relatedness of the objects. Thus, full matches and functional mis-
matches had to be judged as matching, whereas spatial mismatches
and double mismatches had to be judged as mismatching. If
observers judge actions relying on action representations that
include knowledge about both how an action is carried out and
which types of objects are required, then the judgment should be
facilitated when the functional relation is appropriate. This is
because, for functionally related objects, there should be a corre-
sponding action representation that supplies additional evidence as
to the action carried out with them, whereas for functionally
unrelated objects no such representation should exist. Note that in
the present experiment the functional relation was fully task irrel-
evant. The stimuli were designed in such a way that the object’s
parts relevant to the spatial task (i.e., the tip of the instrument and
the slot of the target object) were always presented at the same
spatial positions. Therefore, participants did not need to identify
the objects to find these parts. Moreover, even if instrument and
target object were not functionally related, each of them still
afforded a plugging action (e.g., ticket, credit card reader).
To test whether instruments and target objects have an asym-
metric influence on the activation of the action representations, we
varied the order in which the effector or instrument and the object
were presented between participants. If instruments are more ef-
ficient in accessing the respective action representations, then the
effects of irrelevant functional mismatches should be enhanced
when presented in the first frame because the required functional
relation can then be prespecified. If, however, the functional rela-
tion is derived after instrument and target object are known, no
differences between the two orders of presentation are expected.
Method
Participants. Thirty-two participants (16 men, 16 women), all stu-
dents at the University of Munich, took part in the experiment. They
ranged in age from 20 to 35 years. All participants were right-handed
and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. They received a payment
of €5 ($5) for their participation. Half of the participants were presented
with actions preceding the target objects, and the other half used the
reverse assignment. The key assignment was counterbalanced across
participants. Half of them pressed the left key for a correct judgment
and the right key for an incorrect judgment. The other half used the
reversed assignment.
Materials and apparatus. The stimulus set consisted of 32 photo-
graphs. They obtained 9 visual degrees vertically and 6° horizontally, given
the viewing distance of 60 cm. Sixteen pictures showed a hand holding one
of the eight different objects to be plugged (screwdriver, coin, key, trolley
pin, safety belt, knife, ticket, or credit card) in two different orientations
each (vertically or horizontally). The other half of the pictures showed the
corresponding eight target objects with the respective openings (screw, slot
for the coin, lock, trolley, credit card reader, ticket canceller, knife holder,
or slot for safety belt), again, in both orientations.
Out of these photographs, two-frame sequences were assembled. For
each stimulus depicting a target object, there were four combinations with
different objects to be inserted. One combination created a match on both
dimensions so that the device to be inserted and the target opening matched
functionally and spatially. One combination created a spatial mismatch,
and the functional match was preserved. One combination created a func-
tional mismatch, and the spatial relation remained intact. The last combi-
nation created a mismatch for both relations. The resulting stimulus matrix
was completely balanced. Any target object or plug, which created one of
the mismatches in combination with another stimulus, was completely
appropriate in another one. Also, great care was taken that all of the items
were photographed under identical lighting conditions and that the slots
and pins of functionally mismatching objects were of appropriate size for
a plugging action to be carried out. Thus, effects of stimulus differences
cannot be made accountable for any differences obtained (see Table 1 for
the different combinations of a ticket to the underground, a credit card, and
the respective target objects). All in all, there were 64 different two-frame
sequences.
For all of these sequences, ratings of (a) the familiarity of the actions, (b)
the strength of the associations between instruments and target objects, and
(c) the salience of the action effect were obtained (see the Appendix).
Stimulus presentation and data collection were controlled by an Apple
Power PC. The pictures were presented on an Apple 21 in. monitor
(resolution 1024  768 pixels). Button presses were recorded from the
computer keyboard.
Procedure and design. Upon entering the lab, participants received a
computer-based, written instruction. They were told that they would see
one object being applied to another object and that their task was to judge
whether the orientations of the instrument and the slot of the target object
were appropriate for a plugging action. They were also told to ignore
whether the two objects usually were used together. The experiment proper
lasted for about 30 min and consisted of 2 blocks of 192 trials each. The
order of sequences in each block was randomized. In each block, an equal
number of trials consisted of a full match, a spatial mismatch, a functional
mismatch, and a double mismatch. Thus, half of the trials required a match
response, and half required a mismatch response.
The course of each trial was as follows: First, a fixation cross appeared
in the middle of the screen for 300 ms. After an interval of 400 ms, the first
frame was displayed for 800 ms. In the instrument-first group, this frame
showed a hand holding one of the eight instruments in one of the two
orientations. In the target-first group, it showed one of the eight target
objects in one of the two orientations. The second frame appeared imme-
diately afterward with no interstimulus interval. For the instrument-first
group, it now showed one of the eight target objects in both orientations,
whereas for the target-first group it showed one of the eight instruments to
Table 1












Credit card Horizontal Full match Spatial mismatch Functional mismatch Double mismatch
Credit card Vertical Spatial mismatch Full match Double mismatch Functional mismatch
Ticket Horizontal Functional mismatch Double mismatch Full match Spatial mismatch
Ticket Vertical Double mismatch Functional mismatch Spatial mismatch Full match
Note. Each stimulus occurs once in each of the four conditions. Thus, reaction times in the four different conditions are based on exactly the same stimuli.
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be inserted in the two orientations. This frame remained on the screen until
a response was given. The upper time limit for judging whether the spatial
relation was appropriate by pressing one of two keys was 1,500 ms. If the
judgment was correct, the next trial started after an intertrial interval of 200
ms. If an error was committed, or the response was too slow, a short error
message was displayed.
Results
Figure 2 shows the RTs (upper panel) and error rates (lower
panel) in Experiment 1A. Only trials in which the participants
delivered a correct judgment were included in the analysis of RTs.
Trials in which the participants pressed the wrong button (10%) or
Figure 2. Reaction times (RTs; upper panel) and error rates (lower panel) in Experiment 1A (plugs, spatial
task). The two bars on the left display the data for trials in which spatially matching actions had to be judged,
and the two bars on the right display the data for trials in which spatially mismatching actions had to be judged.
The black and white bars show irrelevant functional matches and mismatches, respectively.
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did not react in the given RT interval of 1,500 ms (4%) were
excluded. The first 16 trials were considered training trials and
were also excluded. The remaining reaction times were entered
into a 2  2  2 repeated-measurements analysis of variance
(ANOVA) with the factors order of presentation (instrument first,
target first), relevant relation (spatial match, spatial mismatch) and
irrelevant relation (functional match, functional mismatch). The
significance was tested at an alpha of .05.
The ANOVA revealed a main effect for relevant relation, F(1,
30)  47.6, p  .01. Actions were judged faster as being spatially
matching (M  582 ms, s  128 ms) than mismatching (M  633
ms, s  122 ms). There also was a main effect for irrelevant
relation, F(1, 30)  19.07, p  .01. Actions were judged slower
when there was an irrelevant functional mismatch (M  612 ms,
s 124 ms) than when there was none (M 602 ms, s 124 ms).
Order of presentation approached significance, F(1, 30)  3.33,
but did not interact with any other factor.
The error rates were entered into the same ANOVA. There were
significant effects for neither relevant relation, F(1, 30)  .08, nor
order of presentation, F(1, 30)  1.46. The main effect of irrele-
vant relation approached significance, F(1, 30)  3.24.
Discussion
The spatial relation was judged faster when instrument and
target object were functionally related, although the functional
relation was task irrelevant and was to be ignored. Order of
presentation did not modify the effects, although ratings of the
stimuli showed that the associations from the target objects to the
appropriate instruments were stronger than vice versa (see the
Appendix); numerically the effect even pointed in the reverse
direction. This finding therefore suggests that the appropriate
action representations can only be accessed by combinations of
instrument and target object but not by one of the two objects
alone. Thus, for functionally related objects there was an action
representation that also supplied information as to the action
carried out with these objects, thereby facilitating the spatial task.
The lack of a difference between the two orders of presentation
also counters arguments that the effects were due to priming of
often co-occurring stimuli (i.e., participants had more often seen
functionally related objects together than functionally unrelated
objects). If this had been the case, the target objects should have
primed the respective instruments to a stronger extent than vice
versa. Additional evidence against such a view was provided by
the finding that across actions, there was no correlation between
the size of the effect of irrelevant functional mismatches and the
ratings in terms of (a) familiarity and (b) the strength of the
associations between instruments and target objects (see Table A1
in the Appendix).
In everyday action perception, and different from the present
experiment, observers have no advance knowledge as to the action
that is to be carried out. Experiment 1B investigated the effect of
irrelevant functional mismatches in a more ecologically valid
setup.
Experiment 1B: Tools
The present experiment investigated the influence of irrelevant
functional mismatches in a less restricted action domain of tool use
(e.g., see Figure 3). A variety of action types that differed in the
spatial relations they required were presented at random. One half
of the actions required identical orientations of instrument and
target object to succeed (cleaning a plate with a sponge), whereas
the other half required orthogonal orientations (cutting a piece of
paper with a pair of scissors). The participants again were required
to judge whether the orientation of the objects was appropriate for
an action to be carried out with them. Because the different action
types were presented at random, participants could no longer
compare an observed spatial relation to an action type specified in
the instruction. We hypothesized that participants would compen-
sate for the lack of advance knowledge about the type of action to
be judged by accessing the respective action representation by
means of the functional relation. Thus, if the effects of irrelevant
functional mismatches reflected the activation of action represen-
tations, they would be enhanced. Order of presentation was again
varied between participants to investigate asymmetric influences
of instruments and target objects on action comprehension.
Method
Participants. Thirty-two participants (16 men, 16 women), all students
at the University of Munich, took part in the experiment. None of them had
participated in Experiment 1A. They ranged in age from 20 to 35 years. All
participants were right-handed and had normal or corrected-to-normal
vision. They received payment for their participation. The same factors as
in the previous experiment were counterbalanced.
Material and apparatus. The stimulus set consisted of 32 photographs.
They obtained 10 visual degrees vertically and 7° horizontally, given the
viewing distance of 60 cm. Sixteen pictures showed a hand holding one of
the eight different tools (saw, gas pipe pliers, scissors, wire cutter, sponge,
hole punch, rasp, or sandpaper) in two different orientations each (verti-
cally or horizontally). The other half of the pictures showed the corre-
sponding eight target objects (bough, pipe, piece of paper, wire, plate, stash
of paper, cucumber, or a wooden timber), again, in both orientations. Out
of these photographs, two-frame sequences were assembled. This was done
analogous to the previous experiment.
For all of these sequences, ratings of (a) the familiarity of the actions, (b)
the strength of the associations between instruments and target objects, and
(c) the salience of the action effect were obtained (see the Appendix). The
apparatus was the same as in Experiment 1A.
Figure 3. Examples for actions requiring orthogonal orientations of instrument and target object: (a) full match,
(b) spatial mismatch, (c) functional mismatch, and (d) double mismatch.
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Procedure and design. Upon entering the lab, participants received a
computer-based, written instruction. They were told that they would see
one object being applied to another object and that their task was to judge
whether the orientations of the instrument and the target object were
appropriate to carry out an action. Again, they were also told to ignore
whether the two objects usually were used together.
In all other respects, the procedure and design were the same as in the
previous experiment. This implies that the actions requiring orthogonal and
identical orientations of instruments and target objects were presented at
random.
Results
Figure 4 shows the RTs (upper panel) and error rates (lower
panel) in Experiment 1B. Only trials in which the participants had
Figure 4. Reaction times (RTs; upper panel) and error rates (lower panel) in Experiment 1B (tools, functional
task). The two bars on the left display the data for trials in which spatially matching actions had to be judged,
and the two bars on the right display the data for trials in which spatially mismatching actions had to be judged.
The black and white bars show irrelevant functional matches and mismatches, respectively.
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delivered a correct judgment were included in the analysis of RTs.
Trials in which the participants pressed the wrong button (4%) or
did not react in time (4%) were excluded. The first 16 trials were
considered training trials and were also excluded. The remaining
RTs were entered into a 2  2  2 repeated-measurements
ANOVA with the between-participants factor order of presentation
(instrument first, target object first) and the within-participants
factors relevant relation (spatial match, spatial mismatch) and
irrelevant relation (functional match, functional mismatch). The
significance was tested at an alpha of .05
There was no effect of order of presentation, F(1, 30) .02. The
ANOVA revealed a main effect for relevant relation, F(1, 30) 
56.18, p .01. Participants were faster in judging spatially match-
ing (M 531 ms, s 135 ms) than judging spatially mismatching
actions (M  607 ms, s  142 ms). There also was a main effect
of irrelevant relation, F(1, 30) 28.27, p .01, which was further
qualified by an interaction of relevant relation and irrelevant
relation, F(1, 30)  16.53, p  .01. Post hoc Duncan tests showed
that irrelevant functional mismatches slowed down the judgments
of spatially matching actions (functional match, M  515 ms, s 
129 ms; functional mismatch, M  547 ms, s  141 ms; p  .01)
and, to a lesser extent, those of spatially mismatching actions
(functional match, M 602 ms, s 137 ms; functional mismatch,
M  612 ms, s  148 ms; p  .01). We also checked whether the
results were affected by whether the actions required orthogonal or
identical orientations of instrument and target object. However, no
further significant effects were revealed when this factor was
included in the ANOVA.
Numerically, the effect of irrelevant functional mismatches was
larger than in the previous experiment. We investigated whether
this difference was significant. The RTs of the two experiments
were entered into a repeated measurements ANOVA with the
between-participants factor experiment (plugs, tools) and the
within-participants factors relevant relation (relevant relation is
appropriate or not appropriate) and irrelevant relation (irrelevant
functional relation is appropriate or not appropriate). The ANOVA
revealed a significant interaction of irrelevant relation and exper-
iment, F(1, 30)  5.92, p  .05. Thus, the effect was stronger in
Experiment 1B than in Experiment 1A.
Errors were entered into the same ANOVA. There was no main
effect for order of presentation, F(1, 30)  3.09, orientation, F(1,
30)  0.84 or relevant relation, F(1, 30)  0.45. However, a main
effect for irrelevant relation was found, F(1, 30)  8.44, p  .01.
Irrelevant functional mismatches made the judgment of the spatial
relation less reliable (functional match: M  8.9%, s  8.3%;
functional mismatch: M  10.3%, s  9.2%).
Discussion
The effect of irrelevant functional mismatches reported in the
previous experiment was replicated. Irrelevant functional mis-
matches slowed down the judgment of spatially matching and
mismatching actions. Compared with the effect shown in Experi-
ment 1A, the effect of the irrelevant functional relation was en-
hanced. This enhancement argues against the notion that the ef-
fects were due to priming of often co-occurring stimuli, because
the actions in the tool domain were less familiar than those in the
plugging domain and because the tools and instruments were less
strongly associated with one another (see Figure A1 in the Appen-
dix). Consistently, across actions, the effect of the irrelevant func-
tional mismatches correlated neither (a) with ratings of the strength
of the associations between the objects nor (b) with the familiarity
of the actions (see Table A1 in the Appendix).
There was, however, across actions, a significant correlation
between the saliency of the action goal and the RT difference
between irrelevant functional matches and mismatches. This is
consistent with our view that the action representations subserve
the deriving of the goal of the action. The enhanced effect of
irrelevant functional mismatches then suggests that participants
used the functional relation to access the respective action repre-
sentation in order to gain knowledge about the action to be carried
out, to which, then, the given spatial relation was compared. This
additional step was necessary because other than in the previous
experiment, participants did not have advance knowledge about
the action to be carried out in each trial.
Experiment 2A: Plugs
The first two experiments provided evidence that the functional
relation between target objects and instruments is taken into ac-
count even when irrelevant and to be ignored. In the remaining two
experiments, we investigated whether action representations also
mediate performance in a functional task. Again, participants were
tested for the domain of plugging actions first. Participants decided
whether the two presented objects were usually applied to one
another, irrespective of whether the spatial relation indicated that
a plugging action was carried out. We predicted that irrelevant
spatial mismatches would slow down the judgment of the func-
tional relation. As in the previous experiments, the order of pre-
sentation was varied to investigate whether instruments predefine
the spatial relation. If this were the case, larger effects of irrelevant
spatial mismatches should be obtained when the instrument is
presented in the first frame.
Method
Participants. Thirty-two participants (16 men, 16 women), all students
at the University of Munich, took part in the experiment. None of them had
participated in the previous experiments. They ranged in age from 20 to 35
years. All participants were right-handed and had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision. They received payment for their participation. The same
factors as in the previous experiments were counterbalanced.
Material and apparatus. The material and apparatus were identical to
Experiment 1A.
Procedure and design. The procedure was identical to the previous
two experiments, with one exception. In the written instruction to this
experiment, the participants were told that their task was to judge whether
the two objects were usually plugged into one another. In addition, they
were asked to ignore whether the orientations of the two objects were
appropriate to carry out a plugging action.
Results
Figure 5 shows the RTs (upper panel) and error rates (lower
panel) in Experiment 2A. Only trials in which the participants had
delivered a correct judgment were included in the analysis of RTs.
Trials in which the participants pressed the wrong button (6%) or
did not react in the given interval of 1,500 ms (4%) were excluded.
The first 16 trials were considered training trials and were also
excluded. The remaining RTs were entered into a repeated-
measurements ANOVA with the between-participants factors or-
der of presentation (instrument first, target first), and the within-
471ACTION COMPREHENSION
participants factors relevant relation (functional match, functional
mismatch) and irrelevant relation (spatial match, spatial mis-
match). The significance was tested at an alpha of .05.
There was no significant main effect for irrelevant relation, F(1,
30)  2.52 and for order of presentation, F(1, 30)  3.70. The
ANOVA revealed a main effect of relevant relation, F(1, 30) 
65.6, p .01. Participants were faster reporting a match (M 580
ms, s 104 ms) than reporting a mismatch (M 629 ms, s 101
ms). There also was an interaction of relevant relation and irrele-
vant relation, F(1, 30)  9.74, p  .01. Irrelevant spatial mis-
Figure 5. Reaction times (RTs; upper panel) and error rates (lower panel) in Experiment 2A (plugs, spatial
task). The two bars on the left display the data for trials in which functionally matching actions had to be judged,
and the two bars on the right display the data for trials in which functionally mismatching actions had to be
judged. The black and white bars show irrelevant spatial matches and mismatches, respectively.
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matches slowed down the judgment of functional matches (spatial
match: M  571 ms, s  104 ms; spatial mismatch: M  590 ms,
s  107 ms, p  .01). For functional mismatches, there was no
such difference.
The error rates were entered into the same ANOVA (cf. Figure
5B). No main effects were obtained for relevant relation, F(1,
30)  0.22, irrelevant relation, F(1, 30)  0.38, and order of
presentation, F(1, 30)  2.56. There were no interactions between
the factors. However, for functional matches, a numerical differ-
ence contrary to that observed in RTs was apparent. Participants
made fewer errors when judging functional matches that were
accompanied by a spatial mismatch (M  6.1%, s  3.6%) than
when there was none (M  5.4%, s  3.7%). Although the effect
for RTs was significant but that for error rates was not, it is critical
to assess whether these inverse patterns of error rates and RTs
mark a speed–accuracy trade-off. To test this, we computed the
correlation between the differences in error rates and RTs between
spatially matching and mismatching judgment. There was no ev-
idence of a significant negative correlation (r  .09). Thus, there
was no speed–accuracy trade-off.
Discussion
Irrelevant spatial mismatches slowed down judgments of func-
tionally matching actions. Again, across the different actions, the
size of the difference did neither correlate with (a) the strength of
the associations between instruments and target objects, and (b) the
familiarity of the actions (see Table A1 in the Appendix). As such,
it is unlikely that priming of often co-occurring stimuli was re-
sponsible for this result.
In contrast to irrelevant functional mismatches, irrelevant
spatial mismatches had no effect on the judgment of function-
ally mismatching actions. One explanation for this finding
might be that spatial mismatches created a faster decaying code
than did functional mismatches. Because judgments of func-
tional mismatches were always given later than those of func-
tional matches, the code for spatial mismatches might already
have disappeared. However, there was no correlation between
the size of the effect for mismatching judgments and the delay
of mismatching judgments that would support this explanation
(r  .08).
The finding of irrelevant spatial mismatches affecting only the
judgment of functional matches suggests that the processing of the
spatial relation depends on an appropriate functional relation. This
is consistent with the view that for functionally related objects
there was no corresponding action representation. However, to
interpret this effect with confidence, we attempted to replicate it
within another action domain. Such a replication might also re-
solve a further problem of the present experiment. Although eight
different combinations of instruments and target objects were
presented to the participants, each depicted a plugging action.
Thus, for each action, identical orientations of plug and target
object were required. This being the case, the effect of irrelevant
spatial mismatches could simply reflect a process of visual prim-
ing. An orientation perceived in the first stimulus might visually
prime identical orientations in the second stimulus. In Experiment
2B we attempted to avoid this confound.
Experiment 2B: Effect of Irrelevant Spatial
Mismatches (Tools)
The effect of irrelevant spatial mismatches was investigated
within the domain of tool use. As described above, this domain
included a variety of actions that required different spatial rela-
tions. One half of the actions required identical orientations of
instrument and target object (e.g., cleaning a dish with a sponge).
The other half required orthogonal orientations (e.g. cutting a piece
of paper with a pair of scissors). For the latter class of actions,
identical orientations actually constitute spatial mismatches. For
these types of actions, the orientation-priming explanation predicts
that inappropriate spatial relations speed up the responses, as
instrument and target object would have identical orientations. If,
however, the effect of irrelevant spatial mismatches is due to
deriving the spatial relation in regard to possible actions, identical
orientations should also impair the judgment of these types of
actions. Again, the order of presentation was varied to test for
asymmetric influences of instruments and target objects for the
establishment of the spatial relation.
Method
Participants. Thirty-two participants (16 men, 16 women), all students
at the University of Munich, took part in the experiment. None of them had
participated in the previous experiments. They ranged in age from 20 to 35
years. All participants were right-handed and had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision. They received payment for their participation. The same
factors as in the previous experiments were counterbalanced.
Material and apparatus. The material and apparatus were identical to
those of Experiment 1B.
Procedure and design. In the written instruction to this experiment, the
participants were told that their task was to judge whether the two objects
were usually applied to one another. They were asked to ignore whether the
orientations of the two objects were appropriate for an action to be carried
out. As in Experiment 1B, the actions requiring orthogonal and identical
orientations were presented at random. In all other respects, the procedure
and the design were identical to those of the previous experiment.
Results
Figure 6 shows the RTs (upper panels) and error rates (lower
panels) in Experiment 2B. Only trials in which the participants had
delivered a correct judgment were included in the analysis of RTs.
Trials in which the participants pressed the wrong button (5%) or
did not react in time (5%) were excluded. The first 16 trials were
considered training trials and were also excluded. The remaining
RTs were entered into a 2  2  2  2 repeated measurements
ANOVA with the between-participants factor order of presentation
(instrument first, target object first) and the within-participants
factors relevant relation (functional match, functional mismatch),
irrelevant relation (spatial match, spatial mismatch), and orienta-
tion (orthogonal orientations required, identical orientations re-
quired). The significance was tested at an alpha of .05.
There was a main effect of relevant relation, F(1, 30)  33.30,
p  .01. Once again, participants were faster in judging functional
matches (M  506 ms, s  128 ms) than functional mismatches
(M  544 ms, s  136 ms). No significant main effects were
obtained for the factors irrelevant relation, F(1, 30)  1.45, ori-
entation, F(1, 30)  3.41, and order of presentation, F(1, 30) 
0.15. The ANOVA revealed, however, an interaction of relevant
relation and orientation, F(1, 30)  4.41, p  .05. For the actions
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requiring identical orientations, there was a large difference be-
tween the judgment of matches (M  497 ms, s  129 ms) and
mismatches (M  543 ms, s  136 ms). This difference was
smaller for actions requiring orthogonal orientations (matching:
M  516 ms, s  132 ms; mismatching: M  546 ms, s  138
ms).
There was also an interaction of relevant relation and irrelevant
relation, F(1, 30) 8.27, p .01. Post hoc Duncan tests show that
an irrelevant spatial mismatch slowed down the judgment of
functional matches ( p .005; spatial match: M 501 ms, s 128
ms; spatial mismatch: M  512 ms, s  131 ms). For functional
mismatches there was no such difference (spatial match: M  546
ms, s  134 ms; spatial mismatch: M  543 ms, s  139 ms).
None of the effects was further qualified by orientation.
The errors were entered into the same ANOVA. No main effects
were obtained for relevant relation, F(1, 30)  4.01, irrelevant
relation, F(1, 30)  3.06, orientation, F(1, 30)  0.67, and order
of presentation, F(1, 30)  .16. It revealed only a significant
three-way interaction of relevant relation, irrelevant relation, and
orientation, F(1, 30)  4.57, p  .05. Only the error rates for
functional matches requiring identical orientations were affected
by an irrelevant spatial mismatch (spatial match: M  4.9% ms,
s  6.1%; spatial mismatch: M  6.8%, ms, s  7.5%).
Discussion
The results of Experiment 2A were replicated. Judgments of
functionally matching actions were faster when the irrelevant
spatial relation was also matching. Because this difference was
found for actions requiring identical and orthogonal spatial rela-
tions, it cannot be explained by assuming a process of visual
priming. Rather, this finding is consistent with the view that the
action representations mediating the judgment of the appropriate
functional relation also include information about the actions usu-
ally carried out with these objects. As in the previous experiment,
irrelevant spatial mismatches only affected the judgment of func-
Figure 6. Reaction times (RTs; upper two panels) and error rates (lower two panels) of actions requiring
identical (left panels) and orthogonal spatial relations (right panels) in Experiment 2B (tools, functional task). In
each panel, the two bars on the left display the data for trials in which functionally matching actions had to be
judged, and the two bars on the right display the data for trials in which functionally mismatching actions had
to be judged. The black and white bars show irrelevant spatial matches and mismatches, respectively.
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tional matches. Again, there was no indication that the effect was
due to the RT difference between match and mismatch judgments
because the correlation between the size of the effect for mis-
matching judgments and the delay of mismatching judgments was
positive (r  .20). We therefore suggest that the processing of the
spatial relation depends on an appropriate functional relation. For
functionally unrelated objects, no such action representation exists,
and therefore, the detection of a functional mismatch is not af-
fected by irrelevant spatial mismatches.
Also note that, again, the effect of irrelevant spatial mismatches
evoked by the different actions did not correlate with their famil-
iarity nor did it correlate with the strength of the associations
between instruments and target objects. The significant correlation
with the saliency of the action goal, however, illustrates our
interpretations that these action representations subserve the de-
riving of the ultimate goal of the action.
General Discussion
In four experiments, we investigated whether observers were
able to selectively judge whether the spatial relation between an
instrument and a target object was appropriate for an action to be
carried out or whether the objects were functionally related. Both
spatial and functional mismatches affected the judgment of the
respective other relation even though the mismatches were com-
pletely irrelevant to the task and had to be ignored. Functional
mismatches slowed down the identification of a spatial match
and—to a lesser extent—the identification of a spatial mismatch.
Irrelevant spatial mismatches also slowed down the identification
of a functional match but did not slow down the identification of
a spatial mismatch. Such interdependencies were predicted if (a)
perceived actions were mapped onto the action representations an
observer would rely on if he or she carried out the actions, and if
(b) these representations incorporated information about which
objects had to be used and which action had to be carried out for
the goal of the action to be achieved.
Very similar results were obtained in a patient study by Riddoch
and colleagues (Riddoch, Humphreys, Edwards, Baker, & Wilson,
2003). The authors examined patients suffering from visual ex-
tinction who had difficulties in perceiving two objects at the same
time. Visual extinction was, however, alleviated when the objects
were both functionally related (e.g., pencil, ruler) and when they
were presented in a spatial configuration suitable for an action to
be carried out with them (e.g., pencil above ruler). The authors
argued that action relations defined in both spatial and functional
terms bound the objects together. Thus, the present findings can be
seen as an extension of the findings of Riddoch et al. (2003) with
healthy participants. In addition, our findings provide insights into
how these representations are accessed during action perception.
Each of the experiments suggested that an appropriate functional
relation was a boundary condition for the activation of the inte-
grated action representations.
In Experiment 1A, in which participants had to decide whether
the spatial relation between two objects was appropriate for a
plugging action, the judgments were facilitated if the two objects
were functionally related. This effect cannot be attributed to prim-
ing of often co-occurring stimuli. In this domain, the target objects
were more strongly associated to the instruments than vice versa
(see the Appendix). If the effect were due to instruments priming
the target objects and vice versa, the effect of irrelevant functional
mismatches should have been larger when the target objects were
presented first. However, no such difference was observed. Nu-
merically, the effect was even larger when instruments were pre-
sented first. Second, even when functionally unrelated, each of the
single objects in a given trial afforded a plugging action (e.g.,
ticket, credit card reader). As such, functionally related objects
activated plugging actions to a stronger extent than each object
itself. This suggests that there was an action representation for
functionally related objects that also specified the action with
which these objects are applied to one another.
Converging evidence for this notion was provided by the com-
parison of Experiment 1A and 1B. In Experiment 1A, participants
had advance knowledge that in every trial a plugging action was
carried out, whereas in Experiment 1B, they did not have this
knowledge because a variety of action types were presented at
random. In Experiment 1B, the effect of irrelevant functional
mismatches was enhanced. This suggests that participants accessed
an action representation by means of functional information to
compensate for the lack of advance knowledge. The enhancement
also provides further evidence against priming accounts. A prim-
ing account would have predicted a smaller effect in Experiment
1B because the actions in the domain of tool use were less familiar
and the two objects involved were less strongly associated. Fur-
thermore, the delay of irrelevant functional mismatches did not
correlate with the familiarity of the actions nor did it correlate with
the strength of the associations between the objects. However, it
did correlate with the saliency of the action goal (see Table A1 in
the Appendix). This finding cannot be explained by priming ac-
counts, but it is consistent with our view that these representations
subserve the deriving of the goal of a perceived action.
Another possibility that warrants consideration is that an appro-
priate functional relation might have informed participants about
the parts of the objects relevant for the spatial task (e.g., in the
plugging domain: the tip of the screwdriver and the slot of the
screw) and directed their attention toward these parts. However, in
the present paradigm, it was not necessary to localize the relevant
parts because the stimuli were designed in such a way that the
relevant parts were always presented at the same spatial positions.
Moreover, if anything, the need to localize the relevant parts
existed in the plug domain for target objects only, for which only
the slot was rotated. In the tool domain and for instruments in the
plugging domain, the rotations always affected the objects as a
whole. If such a process was the source of the observed effects of
irrelevant functional mismatches, (a) these effects should have
been stronger in the plugging domain compared with the tool
domain, and (b) there should have been an influence of the order
of presentation in the plugging domain. However, neither of these
effects was observed.
Performance in the functional task (Experiments 2A and 2B)
also suggested an important contribution of functional information
to the activation of the action representations. Participants had to
decide whether the two objects were usually applied to one an-
other. They detected a functional match more easily when the
spatial relation evoked the particular action usually carried out
with these objects. Thus, an appropriate spatial relation provided
additional activation to an action representation that was already
accessed on the basis of functional information. This notion is
confirmed by the finding that for functionally unrelated objects—
for which there should be no corresponding action representa-
tion—an irrelevant spatial mismatch did not lead to delayed RTs.
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This was the case even when each of the two objects afforded a
plugging action in Experiment 2A. Thus, the effect of irrelevant
spatial mismatches was brought about by knowledge about the
particular action that was carried out with the given target object
and the particular instrument but not by the actions associated with
the particular objects themselves. This interpretation is comple-
mented by the significant correlation between the delay of irrele-
vant spatial mismatches and the saliency of the action goals in the
tool domain (see Table A1 in the Appendix). Although prelimi-
nary, this finding suggests that an action representation was ac-
cessed because the combination of objects was appropriate to
produce a meaningful effect in the environment. An appropriate
action derived from the spatial relation provided additional acti-
vation for this representation.
The strong influence of functional information on the activation
of the action representations might be surprising in the light of
theories claiming that the processes of the parietal-premotor path-
way alone (which culminate in the firing of mirror neurons) are
sufficient for action understanding. If, however, the parietal-
premotor pathway is oblivious to the function of the elements, this
claim has to be qualified. When actions involving instruments are
perceived, the functional relation seems to provide a context in
which the actions are judged. One possibility is that as soon as an
object is identified in the temporal lobe, direct connections could
provide the parietal cortex with information about the actions
usually carried out with the observed object (e.g., Chao & Martin,
2000; Johnson-Frey, 2004), thereby facilitating the spatial task.
However, it is not clear whether the temporo-parietal connections
supply the parietal system with the object parts relevant for action
(Creem & Proffitt, 2001; Goodale & Humphrey, 1998) or with the
actions themselves. For instance, Passingham and Toni (2001; see
also Toni, Ramnani, Josephs, Ashburner, & Passingham, 2001)
have shown that the actions associated to stimuli are transferred to
the parietal-premotor pathway via the prefrontal cortex but not
directly from the temporal to the parietal lobes. Moreover, as
discussed above, the effects of the irrelevant functional mis-
matches did not depend on the single objects involved. Rather,
they depended on the relation between them. This was comple-
mented by the finding of significant correlations between the RT
costs for irrelevant functional mismatches and the saliency of the
goal for different actions in the tool domain. As of yet, it has not
been shown that the temporal cortex codes such relational or
goal-related information.
It is also unclear how parieto-temporal connections would ac-
count for the effects of irrelevant spatial mismatches on functional
judgments. Assuming that these connections are bidirectional, an
action identified in parietal-premotor pathway might prime the
objects usually used in this action, thereby facilitating the func-
tional task. However, the parietal cortex (from which these con-
nections originate) is usually not assumed to represent the type of
action perceived. Such knowledge is available only later in the
processing stream (i.e., the premotor cortex). In addition, parieto-
temporal connections cannot explain why irrelevant spatial mis-
matches impaired the judgments of functional matches but not the
judgments of functional mismatches because the parietal-premotor
pathway is functionally blind. Thus, objects associated with an
action should be primed regardless of whether these objects are
functionally related.
The results seem to be more consistent with the assumption that
the observed interactions were mediated by the prefrontal cortex.
The prefrontal cortex is connected to both the temporal lobe and to
the parietal-premotor pathway and is therefore ideally located to
receive functional information about objects and about the type of
action perceived. In addition, earlier research on action production
suggests that the prefrontal cortex receives information from areas
in the ventral stream about an object’s identity and that it selects an
appropriate action with respect to the actor’s intention by biasing
neurons in the premotor or parietal cortices (Arbib & Bota, 2003;
Rizzolatti & Luppino, 2003). In action perception, the prefrontal
cortex could fulfill a similar function. In such a model the action
type and the objects are initially identified separately in the
parietal-premotor pathway and the temporal lobe, respectively.
The prefrontal cortex would then bind object-related and action-
related aspects into an integrated action representation when the
objects are functionally related. If such a role of the prefrontal
cortex were confirmed in neuroimaging studies, one would have to
conclude that the areas of the parietal-premotor pathway are not
the only areas that show mirror properties. Rather, functional
information about objects might also be a part of the representa-
tions that guide action production as well as action understanding.
A final question is whether the presentation of effectors is
necessary to evoke the observed effects. This does not seem be the
case. In the aforementioned study of Riddoch et al. (2003), effects
of the spatial and functional relations were observed in the absence
of effectors. This does not necessarily imply that the results have
no implication for action comprehension. In fact, the authors
argued that the patients were still “seeing the action” although no
effectors were presented. This interpretation is consistent with
findings that the mere presentation of objects suffices to activate
the actions one could carry out with them (e.g., Chao & Martin,
2000) and that actors conceive tools as if they were their effectors
(e.g., Maravita, Husain, Clarke, & Driver, 2001; Maravita, Spence,
Kennetta, & Driver, 2002). This is nicely illustrated by various
Hollywood movies demonstrating that humans are perfectly capa-
ble of understanding actions even if the objects were handled by an
“invisible man.” One might therefore conclude that the action
representations do not code the action itself but a goal state
(defined in spatial and functional terms) that has to be achieved for
the action to realize its intended effect. Given that there are
reciprocal connections between such action representations and the
goal of the action, accessing these representations might provide
one avenue for the observer to truly understand a perceived action.
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Ratings of the Stimuli
Twenty-five participants who did not participate in any of the experi-
ments completed questionnaires about the stimuli used in the present
experiments. The questionnaire consisted of six pages and could be com-
pleted in less than 5 min time. It had three distinct parts. Each part
contained the eight fully appropriate combinations of instruments and
target object from each action domain used in the present experiments.
Associations Between Instruments and Target Objects
The reciprocal associations between instruments and target objects were
assessed. Participants rated the actions in terms of how many instruments
other than the depicted instrument could be applied to the depicted target
object (very few, few, average, many, very many). The rationale was that
the more other instruments could be applied to a given target object, the
weaker the associations from the target object to the particular instrument
should be. In a second step, participants also judged to how many other
target objects a given instrument could be applied. Figure A1 (top panel)
shows the results of the rating task.
A repeated-measures ANOVA with the factors domain (plugging, tool
use) and type (instrument, target object) was conducted on the data. The
results revealed significant main effects of domain, F(1, 24)  107.7, p 
.01, and type, F(1, 24)  10.0, p  .01, and an interaction of the two
factors, F(1, 24)  9.8, p  .01. Post hoc Duncan tests show that in the
plugging domain, instruments were more strongly associated to the target
objects than the target objects were to the instruments (from target objects
to instruments, M  4.3, s  .62 ms; from instruments to target objects,
M  3.6, s  .55 ms; p  .01). For the tool domain, there was no such
difference (from target objects to instruments, M  2.5, s  .82 ms; from
instruments to target objects, M  2.6, s  .71 ms; p  .64). In addition,
in the plugging domain, the associations from instruments to target objects
and the associations from target objects to instruments were stronger than
in the domain of tools use (both ps  .0001).
Familiarity With the Actions
In the second part, the familiarity of the actions was assessed. The same
actions as in the first part were presented. Participants indicated on a scale
of five levels (very rarely, rarely, average, often, very often) how often
they had observed the depicted actions and how often they had carried out
these actions. Figure A1 (middle panel) shows the results of the rating task.
An ANOVA with the factors experience (observation, production) and
domain (plugs, tools) was conducted on the data. The results revealed a
main effect for experience, F(1, 24)  7.7, p  .05, indicating that the
actions were more often observed (M  3.8, s  .81 ms) than carried out
(M 3.6, s .87 ms). In addition, there was a main effect for domain, F(1,
24)  48.2, p  .01, reflecting that the actions in the plug domain (M 
4.1, s  .75 ms) were more familiar than those in the tool domain (M 
3.3, s  .79 ms).
Saliency of the Action Goal
In the third part, the saliency of these goals of the actions was assessed.
The same actions as in the first two parts were presented. Each of them was
Figure A1. Results of the rating task. The upper panel shows the strength of
the associations from instruments to target objects (white bars) and from target
objects to instruments (black bars) for both action domains (plugs on the left,
tools on the right). Higher ratings correspond to fewer alternative target objects
and instruments and therefore indicate stronger associations. The middle panel
shows the ratings of the familiarity of the actions. For both action domains,
black bars reflect how often these actions have been observed, and white bars
mark how often they had been carried out by the participants. The lower panel
marks the saliency of the action goal in both action domains. In all panels, the
error bars represent the standard error of the mean.
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accompanied by a description of the goal to be achieved by the action (e.g.,
ticket, ticket canceller: “canceling a ticket”). The participants rated how
apparent this goal was on a scale of five levels (very apparent, apparent,
average, unapparent, very unapparent). Figure A1 shows the results of the
rating task.
An ANOVA with the factor domain (plugs, tools) revealed a significant
difference between the domain of plugging actions and that of tool use,
F(1, 24) 6.0, p .05, reflecting that the action effects were less apparent
in the domain of tool use (M  4.1, s  .69 ms) than in the domain of
plugging actions (M  4.4, s  .47 ms).
Correlations With the Observed Effects
of Irrelevant Mismatches
We also computed correlations between the different measures of the
rating task for each of the actions with the actual size of the effect of the
irrelevant mismatches as for each of the experiments, separately (see Table
A1). To do this, the delay associated with the respective irrelevant mis-
matches was computed by subtracting the RTs for irrelevant mismatches
from the RTs of the irrelevant matches in matching-judgments conditions
for each of the eight stimuli in both orders of presentation (instruments and
target objects). Thus, there were 16 different values of the delay of
irrelevant mismatches for each experiment.
These delays were then correlated with the measures of the rating task,
as follows. For correlations with the strength of the associations, the eight
ratings of the target objects and the eight ratings of the instruments were
assigned to the eight delay values from the two orders of presentation.
Ratings of the associations from instruments to target objects were as-
signed to the delay values of the instrument-first conditions, and vice versa.
For correlations with the two ratings of familiarity (observed and pro-
duced) and the salience of the effect, each value of the ratings was assigned
to the corresponding two stimuli from both orders of presentation because
whole actions were rated and not the single objects (e.g., the same rating
of “canceling a ticket” was assigned to both the delay of irrelevant
mismatches when the ticket canceller was presented first and the delay of
irrelevant mismatches when the ticket was presented first).
The results showed that the delay associated with the irrelevant mis-
matches in the four experiments did not correlate with the strength of the
associations between instruments and target objects, nor did it correlate
with the familiarity of the actions (see Table A1). In the domain of tool use,
however, the delay associated with irrelevant spatial and functional mis-
matches was correlated with the saliency of the action goal.
Received December 8, 2003
Revision received October 28, 2004
Accepted November 2, 2004 
Table A1
Correlations of the Effects of Irrelevant Mismatches With










1A: Plugs .21 .21 .17 .36
1B: Tools .16 .23 .42 .62*
2A: Plugs .02 .18 .24 .03
2B: Tools .07 .15 .15 .45*
Note. In Experiments 1A and 1B space was relevant and function was
irrelevant. In Experiment 2A and 2B function was relevant and space was
irrelevant.
* p  .05, one-tailed.
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